Internal Liability Officer (Law Proposal)

With the enactments of this bill, an Internal Liability Officer (ILO) will be ‘elected’ to ensure that the Alliance government in the GIA adheres to certain standards produced by our legislation to and from this point. The rules of it’s formation and specific duties are listed below.

1)The ILO will be comprised of one nation

2)The Officer will be self–nominated (or otherwise nominated) and the approved by the Appointment Committee.

2a)If more than one nation is nominated, after the App. Committee vets the candidates, there will be an election exclusive to the App. Committee.

2b) No more than three nations may run, and if more than three are nominated, the three seperate committee committee chairs (App. Domestic, Security) shall decide which three will run.

2c) The election will be decided based on a majority vote.

2d) The ILO shall remain in office until the end of the president’s term, and if uncontested at that time, shall continue to stay in office until the next term has ended or he/she is deemed inadequate (as determined by a piece further down) by the Domestic Committee.

When the Officer is elected, his/her duties shall be to..

1)Ensure that all members of the Alliance Bureaucracy are upholding all legislation to and from this point.

2)Ensure that corruption is not being indulged by any government officials.

2a) “Corruption“ is described as: Back deals, voter fraud, double voting, lawmaking with criminal intent, lawmaking with intent to seize power, dormancy, inappropriate use of granted powers, actions resulting in self–gain over allied benefit, discrimination towards fellow allied nations, and other actions deemed corrupted by discretionary standards.

3)Ensure that each position is maintained and contained position. With its intrusiveness into affairs being only relevant to its nature as determined by legislation.

4) Ensure that all officials are held liable for all actions they have taken part in (and in some cases, out) of office.

5) Ensure that all attempts to thwart necessary transparency and shirking of positional duties do not go unnoticed (or in some cases unpunished)

In order to ensure all of these points, the ILO is granted the following powers.

1)The ability to call for the impeachment of an official.

1a) Due process for this would be for the ILO to call for an impeachment of an official, provide a detailed report of why the nation is being impeached, and then a vote on such as determined by legislation, with the addition of the ILO having one vote in the process.

2)The responsibility to publish a detailed report whenever possible (and at least once every 14 days) as to comment on any and all questionable activities in the GIA’s government.

3) The Responsibility to provide alternative courses of actions when a Government official makes a suggestion that is deemed unconstitutional (meaning, not obeying legislation)

4) The power of tasteful discretion. The elected IAO will use this document and his/her own discretion to determine who is being unlawful, and any corruption in the GIA.

As the check, the ILO will be on watch by the Domestic Committee.

1) If the ILO’s power is becoming too great and is breaching corruption, the domestic committee is liable to submit a report to the App. Committee to propose Impeachment.

1a) Impeachment of the member would be possible with 2/3 of the App. Committee’s consent.

So that would be my proposal.

Thoughts? It’s a rough draft, but what could be done to make it better?

The nation of Silverdale likes this proposal, but wishes to raise one concern.

"5) Ensure that all attempts to thwart necessary transparency and shirking of positional duties do not go unnoticed (or in some cases unpunished)"

What 'necessary transparency' is expected of Silverdale?

As a government official, 'necessary transparency' is mostly referring to making actions taken by that official public, so that we can be sure that no corrupt actions are being taken.

Every ILO will have a different interpretation of the scope of such, as the legislation is more guidelines than hard and fast rules.

Silverdale finds this response vague. For us to vote in favour of creating the position of ILO, clear limitations on the ILO's power, must be in place. Silverdale is concerned that it could one day be asked to release secret and sensative national information to the ILO under the justification of 'necessary transparency.' For this reason alone, we have voted against the creation of the ILO, although we are in favour of the idea.